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Incompatibility and entailment in
the logic of norms
Giovanni Battista Ratti
 
1 Foreword
1 In  this  essay,  I  aim at  critically  examining  some  of  the  theses  concerning  the
incompatibility and the entailment between and among norms, which are defended by
Eugenio Bulygin in a well-known article,1 bearing upon the conceptions of the logic of
norms articulated by Weinberger and Kelsen (section 2). 
2 I also intend to analyse Bulygin’s interesting thesis that given a charitable reading of the
theses defended by the “last” Kelsen, the expressive conception of norms (that is to say,
that theory that conceives the norms as the results of illocutionary acts of prescribing,
carried out on propositional contents) is perfectly capable of explaining the relation of
justification  that  mediates  general  norms  and  particular  norms  (especially,  between
legislated  norms  and  judicial  decisions).  Being  capable  of  this,  such  a  conception  is
immune to accusations of “irrationalism”, as argued by Weinberger (section 3).
3 This work is concluded by formulating a theoretical problem that Bulygin (and with him a
large number of of legal theorists and deontic logicians) should face: either the notion of
satisfiability of norms is accepted and the “rationality” of the expressive conception is
saved,  or  this  notion  is  rejected  and  with  it  also  the  possibility  of  an  “expressive
rationality” in legal reasoning (section 4).
 
2 Satisfiability and incompatibility
4 The starting point of Bulygin’s analysis is constituted by the well-known theses of the last
Kelsen on law and logic. 
5 Kelsen (1991) argues that logic cannot be applied to law because (1) norms lack truth-
values,  and  being  logicaly  truth-functional,  genuinely  logical  inferences  with  norms
Incompatibility and entailment in the logic of norms
Revus, 35 | 2018
1
cannot be carried out, (2) norms are linked to the performance of linguistic acts, and logic
does not mediate between acts, but between propositional contents.
6 While admitting that norms lack truth-values, Weinberger (1981) argues that logic can be
applied  to  norms.  However,  as  Bulygin  brilliantly  shows,  some  fundamental  logical
relations remain very obscure in his approach. 
7 For example, Weinberger argues that the norm “~Op” is not the negation of the norm
“Op” – as one might expect in analogy with propositional logic – but constitutes its repeal
(or, better put, the name of the illocutionary act by means of which such an operation is
carried out). This being so, it is impossible to construct the logical connectives in the
traditional  way,  that  is,  by  using  the  negation  for  the  purposes  of  inter-defining
disjunction,  conjunction,  and conditional  (which,  by the way,  makes  it  impossible  to
apply  De  Morgan’s  laws  to  norms  and  the  definition  of  the  conditional  in  terms  of
disjunction or conjunction). With this alone, we would already face a much-weakened
form of logic of norms.
8 In addition, this has important repercussions on the correlated notions of incompatibility
and implication. Following Bulygin, let us start with incompatibility. The intuitive way to
draw an analogy between propositional  contradiction (“p & ~p”)  and incompatibility
between norms is to identify the complex sentence “Op & ~Op” as the paradigmatic case
of contradiction between norms. However, we have seen that Weinberger regards “~Op”
as the representation of an act of repeal and therefore the notion of contradiction in the
normative realm cannot be analogous to the propositional notion.
9 The  other  possibility  for  Weinberger’s  theory  (1981:  70)  consists  in  identifying  a
normative incompatibility in the statement “Op & O~p”, that is between the mandatory
and the prohibited.
10 On this point, Bulygin (2015: 212) observes: 
In what sense can these two norms be said to be inconsistent? Clearly not in the
same sense as “p” and “~p” are inconsistent, for norms are neither true nor false.
Nor, for reasons of logic, would it do to say that these two norms cannot both be
obeyed  or  satisfied  (at  the  same  time).  This  is  certainly  correct,  but  the
impossibility of satisfaction is due to the fact the propositions “p” and “~p” (that is,
the contents of the two norms) cannot both be true, so we are faced here with an
inconsistency  of  norm-content  and  not  of  norms.  This  inconsistency  of  norm-
content entails the possibility of satisfying both norms, but it does not follow then
that the norms “Op” and “O~p” are inconsistent as well. Therefore, if the alleged
contradiction  between “Op”  and “O~p”  were  only  to  mean that  the  two norms
cannot be satisfied for reasons of logic (that is, independently of all experience),
this would be just another way of saying that the propositions “p” and “~p” are
contradictory, that is, there would be nothing other than an inconsistency between
(descriptive) propositions. 
11 Beyond the philological  problems in Weinberger’s work,  which occupy the remaining
pages of the section to which this quotation belongs and on which I will not elaborate
here, it is important to discuss, even briefly, the idea apparently suggested by Bulygin
that the concept of satisfiability (that is, the fulfilment of what a norm prescribes2) must
be dismissed as a conceptual tool for examining the notion of incompatibility between
norms. 
12 By  rejecting  the  notion  of  satisfiability,  Bulygin  (2015:  214)  comes  to  the  general
conclusion that “the coexistence of ‘Op’ and ‘O~p’ would certainly be undesirable and
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impractical”, precisely because they cannot both be fulfilled at the same time, but “this
alone does not justify our calling them logically inconsistent”.
13 At its core, Bulygin argument is that there is no univocal way to determine when two
norms are incompatible, once the possibility of constructing, or assuming, an analogy
with what occurs in the propositional realm with respect to negation, is discarded.
14 However, this thesis seems liable to at least two different readings.
15 1) The first reading, which we might call cautious, is limited to arguing that the notion of
incompatibility between norms is an intuitive notion, susceptible of being assumed rather
than  explained.  This  seems  to  be  the  understanding  of  the  typical  incompatibility
elaborated by the authors that embraces some form of hyletic conception of norms,3 that
is to say, the position that conceives norms like quasi-propositional entities. The main
argumentative move these authors make consists in drawing some kind of analogy with
the alethic modalities and/or the quantifiers of predicate logic,4 and then developing
some asserted peculiarities of the logic of deontic operators.
16 2) By contrast, the second reading, which we can call radical, holds that it is impossible to
delineate a genuine notion of logical incompatibility between norms, so that – as Bulygin
says – the simultaneous presence of “Op” and “O~p” in the same set of norms would be
undesirable, but it would not allow us to conclude without further ado that the set at
hand is logically incoherent. This reading, taken to its extremes, not only irremediably
undermines the concept of incompatibility between norms, but also seems to question
such basic principles for the concept of implication in standard deontic logic as “Ought
implies may”. This is due to the well-known fact that, in the standard system of deontic
logic,  the  equivalence  “Op F0C9Pp F0BA~(Op  &  O~p)”  is  valid,  that  is,  the  derivation  of  a
permission from an obligation is  equivalent  (by definition of  the conditional)  to  the
simultaneous non-admissibility (or, according to different interpretations, obligation or
satisfiability) of the corresponding obligation and prohibition.
17 The latter would also have obvious repercussions on the notion of implication between
norms. By rejecting the notion of incompatibility between obligation and prohibition, we
would also reject one of the axioms of the logic of norms and therefore eliminate many of
the inferences that can be made with them, unless we elaborate a new logic of norms with
quite different rules of inference. This is precisely what the expressive conception of
norms intends to do. Such a conception, in its most radical form, does not admit the
derivability  of  permissions  from  obligations,  since  the  mere  existence  of  an  act  of
allowing cannot be inferred from the existence of an act of prescribing. Although, as we
shall see shortly, this conception admits some “mediated” forms of derivability between
norms based on the derivation between normative contents.
18 I will not, however, elaborate here on the attempts made by Bulygin and others,5 to build
a genuine expressive logic of norms. Instead, in the next section I shall underline the
main aspects of the explanation of the justification of judicial decisions offered by the
expressive conception.
 
3 Expressive conception and logical derivation 
19 In  the  last  part  of  his  article,  Bulygin  offers  a  criterion  of  justification  for  judicial
decisions from the perspective of  the expressive conception of  norms.  This  criterion
consists in the logical derivability not between norms, which for this conception are the
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results  of  acts  of  prescribing  and  therefore  logically  inert  facts,  but  between  the
propositional contents of such acts.
20 On this point, Bulygin (2015: 218) writes: 
If norms depend on acts of prescribing, then there clearly is no logical entailment
between a general and an individual norm (for example, between the act of the
lawmaker and the act of the judge). There may, however, be a logical relation of
deducibility between the contents of these two acts […] I shall illustrate this with an
example. Suppose the legislative authority issues a general norm to the effect that
all  landowners  should  pay  a  special  tax.  The  proposition  commanded  by  the
lawmaker (that is,  the content of this norm) is that all landowners are to pay a
special tax, and so it is true that all landowners have an obligation to pay the tax
(or, as we might also say, they ought to pay it). Now, from “all landowners are to
pay the tax”, it follows that landowner A is to pay the tax, so the proposition “A is
to pay the tax” belongs to the commanded set, and therefore it is true that A has an
obligation to pay the tax.
21 Obviously, connecting the logical derivation between two norms with different degrees of
generality with the truth of the normative contents ordered by them, is the same as
saying  that  one  norm  entails  the  other  when  their  conditions  of  satisfaction  (or
equivalently, the truth-conditions of its normative contents) are logically linked: it is not
possible for the sentence “All landowners ought to pay the tax X” to be true and the
sentence “Landowner A pays the tax X” be false. Put another way, it is not possible that
the general rule “All landowners ought to pay the tax X” is satisfied (that is, that it is
fulfilled by all its recipients) while the individual norm “The landowner A ought to pay
the tax X” is not satisfied (that is, the recipient A does not comply).
22 This seems to lead Bulygin towards a conceptual tension in his expressivist approach.
Indeed, the notion of satisfiability of norms, which, as we have seen, had been rejected
previously, suddenly reappears here, since a norm can be regarded as satisfied precisely
when the propositional content it prescribes corresponds to reality.
23 Beyond this,  it  should be noted that the conditions for satisfying a norm do not say
anything about reality (that is, whether certain norms are actually fulfilled or not), in the
same way that the truth conditions of a proposition say nothing about whether a certain
proposition is actually true or not. These well-known circumstances lead Bulygin (2015:
218) to affirm that “Being a landowner, A has an obligation to pay the tax, but it may very
well be the case that he does not pay the tax in the allotted time and so does not fulfil his
obligation”. This is correct: from the fact that the effective satisfaction of a general norm
necessarily entails the satisfaction of an individual norm, it does not follow that both
norms are actually fulfilled. Moreover, the lack of satisfaction of the individual norm is a
reason to  conclude  that  the  general  norm by  which it  is entailed  can no  longer  be
satisfied (and this is nothing more than modus tollens applied to the abstract proposition
that the satisfaction of the general norm entails that of the individual norm). All this
would seem to offer a logical criterion to determine, from an expressivist perspective,
whether  the  judicial  conclusion  follows  from  the  premises  (in  particular,  from  the
normative ones).
24 As Bulygin (2015: 218) observes, however, events in law do not usually stop here. If A does
not fulfil his obligation, then
he can be brought before a court. Now the norm that regulates the activity of the
judge  does  not  prescribe  that  all  landowners  who  fail  to pay  their  taxes  be
sentenced, that is, all those of whom it is true that they ought to pay their taxes and
did not pay in the allotted time. Rather, the norm prescribes that all of those of
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whom it has been proven in a court of law that they ought to pay and did not pay be
sentenced. 
25 Here,  Bulygin  already  moves  away  from  the  strictly  logical  problem  of  justification
according to the expressive conception to point to a contingent problem. The problem
consists in the fact that the relations between what must be done according to the law
and the legal consequences that follow from not having realized what was due according
to the law, are mediated, at least in contemporary legal systems, by procedural law. Such
a branch of law requires that the facts, on the basis of which a certain subject has been
prosecuted, be proved.
26 Profitting from the well-known distinction between the primary or subject’s system and
the secondary and judge’s systems, Bulygin (2015: 218–219) affirms:
The two systems are related in the sense that the secondary or the judge’s system
presupposes the existence of the primary or the subject’s system; thus, they are
found at different levels. This gives rise to some interesting situations that might
well seem paradoxical. For instance, it may be true that A ought to pay his taxes
and did not pay them but that judge nevertheless ought not to sentence him (if, for
example, A’s failure to pay has not been proven in court). Vice versa, it may be true
that the judge ought to sentence A for not having paid his taxes, although it is not
true that A failed to pay. 
27 All this does not, however, have much to do with the expressive conception in itself, but
concerns wider considerations of a general theory of law.6 What must be stressed here is
that there does not seem to be room for an expressive logic without the concept of
satisfiability.  However,  to  the  extent  that  it  is  in  the  jurists’  interest  to  explain  the
derivability of particular norms from general norms, the expressive conception seems
completely capable of performing this task.
 
4 Conclusion
28 What has been said so far generates a fundamental problem for Bulygin himself, and with
him, for a large part of legal theory and deontic logic.
29 The  problem  is  the  following:  The  expressive  conception  is  undoubtedly  right  in
underlining that norms lack truth-values, and in maintaining that the existence of any
positive norm depends on an act of promulgation. On this matter, it seems to reconstruct
the ideas of the jurists much better than the hyletic conception. From these premises, it is
easy to conclude that there is no logic of norms and therefore no way to control the
rationality of norms-based decisions.
30 One possible way out of this pessimistic conclusion (perhaps the only truly viable way
out) is to construct a logic of norms based on the notion of satisfiability, as Alchourrón
and Bulygin themselves sometimes seem to suggest by constructing a logic of normative
contents.
31 However, we have seen that Bulygin is reluctant to define the main logical relationships
on the basis  of  the notion of  satisfiability.  This  is  a  fairly common resistance in the
literature on the logic of norms,7 for – so it is argued – to found a logic of norms on a
factual notion as satisfiability cancels any normative peculiarity of such logic. Perhaps,
this is the “price” to pay to harmonize all the ideas at stake. It does not, however, seem to
be too high a price, since – as Bulygin correctly points out – the main logical relation that
jurists try to explain concerns the derivation of individual norms from general norms: on
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this score, an expressive logic, based on the notion of satisfiability, seems to be above
reproach.
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NOTES
1. Bulygin 2015.
2. It is often argued that the concept of satisfiability would not apply to permissions. This thesis
is not entirely correct, since one only needs to introduce the temporal dimension in order to
distinguish the conditions of satisfiability of the permissions and the other normative modalities
(or  situations).  Cf.  Moreso & Vilajosana 2004:  79-80.  However,  it  is  true that,  from a strictly
synchronic  perspective,  permissions  and  obligations  seem  to  have  the  same  conditions  of
satisfiability.
3. Alchourrón & Bulygin 1971 seem to defend this view. 
4. A remarkable exception is found in Navarro & Rodríguez 2014, who develop a complex possible
worlds logic as the foundation of the logic of norms. 
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5. See, for instance, the seminal Alchourrón & Bulygin 1984 and, in more recent literature, the
excellent Kristan 2014. 
6. However, it should be noted in passing that from this discussion, Bulygin draws two
remarkable  consequences.  First,  what  is  to  be  proven  in  the  trial  is  determined  by
substantive law and not by procedural rules. Second, the fact that the judge’s decision,
although legal, is not justified by substantive law makes it possible to say that it is based
on a wrong deliberation. From this it follows, according to Bulygin (2015: 219), that “those
theories that tend to interpret all legal norms as directives addressed to the courts are
deeply mistaken. They lead not only to a distortion of the function of the law but also to a
most inconvenient limitation on the expressive capacity of legal language”. It seems to
me that on this point Bulygin's reasoning ends up being a non sequitur.  If,  as Bulygin
himself  seems  to  affirm,  an  individual  norm  has  as  a  justification  condition  its
derivability, because of its normative content from a general norm, how can it be that an
individual norm that correctly applies the relevant procedural rules brings about a wrong
decision? If norm X imposes on the judge the duty to fine the subjects whose tax evasion
has been proven at trial, and the tax evasion of A has not been proven at trial, how can it
be held, from Bulygin’s own perspective, that the decision that avoids sanctioning A is
wrong?  The  interaction  between  the  subject’s  system  and  the  judge’s  system  is  a
contingent problem, so to speak, of a systematic interpretation of law; but there is little
doubt that, in contemporary legal systems, it is the judge, in the end, who has to decide
about such systematic relationships. And there is nothing wrong in saying that ‘A has an
obligation to pay taxes according to the individual norm Y’, derived from the substantive
general norm Y, and at the same time, that the judge has the obligation to fine those
subjects whose tax evasion has been proven and, therefore, has no obligation to sanction
A, whose tax evasion has not been proven. It seems clear that the theories criticized by
Bulygin,  which hold that all  legal norms are directives addressed to the courts,  have
theoretical objectives different from those of Bulygin. In particular, they want to provide
jurists  with  ways  to  predict  what  the  courts  are  going  to  decide,  so  that  it  is  not
surprising (and much less wrong) that they focus on norms that, beyond the content of
substantive law, empower the judge to make ultimate decisions (that is, they attribute the
value of res judicata to their determinations). On this point, see at least Schauer 2009: Ch.
7.
7. In recent literature, see Navarro & Rodríguez 2014: 54-55.
ABSTRACTS
In this paper I examine critically some theses on the incompatibility and the implication between
norms that appear in a well-known article by Bulygin on the conceptions of the logic of norms
elaborated, respectively, by Weinberger and Kelsen. I also analyze Bulygin’s thesis according to
which the expressive conception of norms, defended by Kelsen in the last part of his career, is
perfectly capable of explaining the relationship of justification that mediates between general
norms and particular norms (especially, between legislated norms and judicial decisions) and,
being capable of this, cannot be accused of “irrationalism”, as Weinberger argues instead. This
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work is concluded by formulating a dilemma that Bulygin should face: either the notion of the
satisfaction of norms is accepted and the “rationalism” of the expressive conception is saved, or
this  notion  is  rejected  and  with  it  also  the  possibility  of  “expressive”  rationality  in  legal
reasoning. | A prior version of this text was presented on 28 July 2015, at the Special Workshop
“Bulygin’s Philosophy of Law”, XXVII IVR Congress, Washington, DC (USA). 
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